四宗

The four kinds of inference in logic-- common, prejudged or opposing, insufficiently founded, arbitrary. Also, the four schools of thought

I.

According to 淨影 Jingying they are

(1) 立性宗 that everything exists, or has its own nature; e. g. Sarvāstivāda, in the 'lower' schools of Hīnayāna;

(2) 破性宗 that everything has not a nature of its own; e. g. the 成實宗 a 'higher' Hīnayāna school, the Satyasiddhi;

(3) 破相宗 that form has no reality, because of the doctrine of the void, 'lower' Mahāyāna;

(4) 願實宗 revelation of reality, that all comes from the (sa) bhūtatathatā, 'higher ' Mahāyāna.

II.

According to 曇隱 Tanyin of the 大衍 monastery they are

(1) 因緣宗, i. e. 立性宗 all things are causally produced;

(2) 假名宗, i. e. 破性宗 things are but names;

(3) 不真宗, i. e. 破相宗, denying the reality of form, this school fails to define reality;

(4) 真宗, i. e. 顯實宗 the school of the real, in contrast with the seeming.